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In psychological experiments on reasoning, participants are typically presented with
premises which refer to general knowledge or which are integrated in an original scenario; then,
either they are asked to derive what follows from the premises or they are provided with one or
several conclusions and asked to decide whether or not these conclusions follow from the
premises. There is always a logical argument underlying the premises and the conclusion, and
the aim of such experiments is to study participants' performance with respect to a theoretical
model, either normative or, as is more usual nowadays, descriptive. The experiments on judgment
do not differ much, except that they look more like a problem to solve, where the final question is
a request for a comparison, a qualitative or a quantitative evaluation, etc. The experiment may be
administered orally during an interview with the experimenter, but more often it is administered
in a written form, using paper and pencil or a computer. Given that there are two interlocutors
engaged in a communication, a conversational analysis is appropriate, whether the presence of
the experimenter is physically real or mediated by the support of the written messages.
After he has been provided with the instructions and the information that supports the
question (the scenario, the argument, the problem statement, etc.) the participant is presented with
the target question. Like any utterance, this question must be interpreted. Its meaning generally is
not straightforwardly identifiable because the information may be more or less long, complicated
(and occasionally conceptually hard). It may also be vague or ambiguous. As for any question,
its interpretation is determined  by the content of the putative answer: the answer should satisfy
the expectation of relevance attributed by the participant to the experimenter. Now, in
experimental settings (as well as in instructional settings and more generally in testing situations)
the participant is aware that the question put to him is a higher order question, that is, does not
implicate 'the experimenter does not know how to find the answer' but rather 'the experimenter
knows how to find the answer and she wants to know whether I know how to find it'.
The interpretation of the question is determined in part and revealed by the specific kind
of knowledge that the participant chooses to exhibit through his response: this choice is made on
the assumption that what is relevant to the experimenter is to know whether the participant has
that kind of knowledge. This choice and the underlying assumption reveal in turn the
participant's representation of the task. This is why knowledge of the population tested is
essential. The range of questions of interest which participants are likely to attribute to the
experimenter must be anticipated by the experimenter (another, higher order, attributional
process) in the light of the participants' educational and cultural backgrounds. This requires a
macroanalysis of the information provided, including the non verbal experimental material (e. g. ,
does the material used suggest that reaction times will be measured?) Social psychologist had
related concerns quite some time ago, albeit more limited and focused on the transparency of the
experiment; e. g. , Orne (1962) defined the notion of demand characteristics as "the totality of
cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject". Only recently did a few
investigators of thinking and reasoning (Hilton, 1995 ; Schwarz, 1996, and co-workers) applied
the so-called « conversational » approach to the relationship between experimenter and
participant, in order to study how participants’ expectations and attributions affect their
responses.
There is, in addition, another kind of analysis, based on pragmatic theory, which needs to
be applied to the sentences used to state the argument or the problem. The output of this analysis
is the determination of the interpretation of the premises, conclusion or question which the
participant is likely to work out; in a word, it delivers the actual proposition(s) which will be
processed during the inferential treatment, taking into account (as will be examplified below) the
frame of the task representation. The reason to perform this microanalysis is that it is an
essential step to guarantee the validity of the experimental task. Indeed the experimenter is
interested in the processing of specific propositions which she expects the participant to recover
from the sentences used in the argument or problem statement. Unluckily (at least in the early
times of the experimental investigation of thinking) these sentences used to be either ackward
and artificial formulations inspired by logic textbooks or sentences expressed in very
impoverished contexts; and it was assumed that some kind of literal meaning was communicated
and then the associated propositions processed. It is clear that a formal logical argument can be
deemed to have been followed or not followed only to the extent that the propositions which
constitute it are those which the participant has actually processed. For example, in the study of
deduction, the endorsement of a conclusion which does not follow validly from the premises, or
the non-endorsement of a conclusion which follows validly can be declared reasoning errors
only if it can be ascertained that the participant did construe the propositions (premises and
conclusion) in a way that coincided with the formal logical description of the argument.
 In brief, knowledge of how people represent reasoning and judgmental tasks and of how
they interpret the premises or the questions is an indispensable prerequisite for the investigation
of the inferential process proper. The recommendation that experimental tasks should be
submitted to a macro- and a microanalysis is made with hindsight. For a long period which
ended in the late seventies, psychologists showed little concern about such problems. The reason
is that most of them were not yet familiar with the tools offered by pragmatic theory (and at an
earlier time pragmatic theory itself was not developped enough to offer such tools). As a result,
many erroneous evaluations of the performance observed in experiments and many unfounded
claims about human rationality were made. This will be illustrated by  reviewing a number of
tasks, some of which have been extremely influential, and by describing some of the
experimental work carried out in support of the pragmatic approach just outlined. Studies that
concern reasoning (deduction and induction) and judgment (probabilistic and classificatory) will
be considered in turn.
Studies of deduction
Quantifiers.
It will be useful to begin with a prototypical case, namely the deductions called immediate
inferences. They are elementary one-premise arguments in which the premise and the conclusion
are quantified sentences which belong to Aristotle's square of opposition. In experiments,
participants are presented with one premise such as, e. g. [on the blackboard] some squares are
white, and asked to evaluate (by 'true', 'false', or 'one cannot know') one or several conclusions
provided to them, such as all squares are white;  no square is white, etc. Whereas performance
for contraries (all...are... to no...are... and vice versa) and for contradictories (all...are... to
some...are not... and vice versa; no...are... to some...are... and vice versa) is nearly perfect,
performance for subalterns (all...are... to some... are... and vice versa;  no...are... to some...are
not... and vice versa) is apparently very poor (around one quarter of the responses coincide with
the formal logical response, that is, 'true' from universal to particular sentences, and 'one cannot
know' from particular to universal sentences, while a strong majority opt for the response 'false'
in both directions. The same obtains for subcontraries (some... are... to  some... are not... and
vice versa) to which most people respond by 'true' instead of the formal logical response 'one
cannot know' which logic textbooks would prescribe (Begg & Harris, 1982; Newstead &
Griggs, 1983; Politzer, 1990).
 It would be a mistake to attribute poor logicality to participants in such experiments.
Assuming that participants process the sentences as if they were uttered in a daily conversation
(rather than using the conventions of logicians which require a literal interpretation), the
microanalysis applied to quantifiers suggests that people add the scalar implicature not all to
some. If this is so, all the data are coherent. A universal sentence (e.g. , all... are...) and its
particular counterpart (some... are...) being contradictory under the interpretation of the latter as
some... but not all are..., the inferences that involve these two sentences will lead the reasoner to
the conclusion 'false'. And similarly, both particular sentences being equivalent to some... are...
but some... are not..., the reasoner concludes 'true' when one is a premise and the other the
conclusion.
As this example shows, pragmatic theory provides the conceptual tools to identify the
propositions actually processed by participants in psychological experiments. It could be argued
that, in return, the tasks used by psychologists can provide useful tools to test some claims made
by pragmatic theory. As far as quantifiers are concerned, one of these claims is that the hearer's
awareness of the speaker's epistemic state can affect his interpretation of some. If the speaker is
known to be fully informed, the choice of the weaker item on the scale does convey an
implicature based on the fact that the stronger item which is more informative or more relevant
was not chosen; but if he is known to be not fully informed, then the choice of the weaker item
may as well be attributed to lack of knowledge, and the implicature is less likely to be generated.
Consider now the following situation. A radar operator is describing the screen. Some
participants are told that the operator is working without time pressure and with certainty, i. e. ,
she is omniscient, and some others that she is working with time pressure and uncertainty (non-
omniscient). Consider the statement, some spots are large. When she is omniscient the use of
some  may license the implicature not all  for the reasons seen above. But when she is not, it
cannot be ruled out that all the spots are large. In an experiment (Politzer, unpublished) that used
this scenario, the frequency of restrictive interpretations of some could be inferred on the basis
of the conclusions that participants endorsed (such as all spots are large). When the speaker
was assumed to be omniscient, the rate of restrictive interpretations was around 75 percent; but
when she was assumed to be non-omniscient it dropped on average to 50 percent. This
difference was reliable and it was observed in a within- as well as in a between-subjects design,
which bears out the general pragmatic prediction. One might wonder why the restrictive
interpretations did not collapse altogether. This seems to illustrate one limitation of the paper-
and-pencil methodology, namely the difficulty for participants to exploit mental states attributed
to fictitious characters. Given the artificiality of the manipulation, one might even regard its effect
as impressive.
Conditional reasoning.
For many years, studies of propositional reasoning have focused on "conditional
reasoning", that is, two deductively valid arguments:
- Modus Ponendo Ponens (MP): if A then C;  A;  therefore C,  and
- Modus Tollendo Tollens (MT): if A then C;  not-C;  therefore not-A,
and two invalid arguments, which are the fallacies of:
- Affirming the Consequent: if A then C;  C;  therefore A,  and
- Denying the Antecedent: if A then C;  not-A;  therefore not-C.
Nearly everyone endorses the conclusion of MP. For example (instantiating A with it
rains, and C with Mary stays at home), given if it rains Mary stays at home and it rains, most
people instructed to consider the premises as true endorse the conclusion Mary stays at home.
However, not everyone endorses the conclusion of MT: knowing for sure that if it rains Mary
stays at home, and that Mary does not stay at home, only about two thirds conclude it does not
rain. Performance on the two invalid arguments seems even less satisfactory: given that if it
rains Mary stays at home, and that it does not rain, around one half of the people endorse the
conclusion Mary does not stay at home, although this does not follow deductively. And
similarly, from the premises if it rains Mary stays at home, and it does not rain, around one half
of the people incorrectly endorse the conclusion Mary does not stay at home. These are robust
observations (Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993).
Invalid arguments.  Do all people who endorse the conclusion of the invalid arguments
commit a fallacy? Let us first consider the microanalysis of the task.
Ducrot (1971) proposed a principle (similar to Grice's first maxim of quantity), which he
called the law of exhaustivity, "give your intelocutor the strongest information that is at your
disposal and that is supposed to be of interest to him", from which it follows that there is a
tendency to comprehend a limited assertion as the assertion of a limitation; in particular, if it
rains Mary stays at home  suggests that it is only in case it rains that Mary stays home, which
explains the interpretation of if  as a sufficient-and-necessary condition (or biconditional for
short).
Geis & Zwicky's (1971) used the now often quoted example if you mow the lawn, I'll
give you five dollars to show that in some contexts a conditional sentence suggests an invited
inference, in the present case the obverse of the original sentence, if you don't mow the lawn, I
will not give you five dollars. This inference was hypothesised to follow from a principle of
conditional perfection, but Lilje (1972) questioned that there is such a principle. He objected that
the inference crucially depends on the circumstances, as shown by the example in which the
target sentence would be a reply to "How can I earn five dollars?" In such a context, there are
alternative antecedents (clean up the garage or whatever) that prevent mowing the lawn from
being a necessary condition. Nevertheless, Geis & Zwicky's paper was very influential, so that
the conditional reasoning task was the first reasoning task to be examined from a pragmatic
point of view (Taplin & Staudenmayer, 1973; Staudenmayer, 1975; Rips & Marcus, 1977).
There are more recent theoretical treatments of conditional perfection (Horn, 2000; van der
Auwera, 1997); without entering the technical debate, it will be assumed that the interpretation of
if as a biconditional stems from an implicature which the hearer may generate on the basis of his
knowledge base, given the aim of the conversational exchange.
This leads us to the macroanalysis. Braine (1978) was among the first psychologists to
stress the differences between 'practical reasoning' which uses premises as they are
comprehended in daily verbal exchange, and formal reasoning which requires a special attitude in
order to set aside implicatures. That there are individual differences in interpretation of the
conditional which can be related to educational background (among other factors) was
demonstrated by the results of a truth-table task (Politzer, 1981). In such a task, given a
conditional sentence if A then C, participants are asked to choose which of the four possible
contingencies (A and C; A and not-C; not-A and C; not-A and not-C) they judge to be
compatible with the sentence. The choices made by Arts students were characteristic of a
biconditional interpretation (A and C; not-A and not-C) more often than the choices made by
Science students; these in turn had  more often the formal interpretation (all cases except A and
not-C). Clearly the Science students (even though they were untutored in formal logic) were
more apt to represent the task as a formal game using literal meaning.
 Now an important point is that under a biconditional interpretation of the conditional
premise the two fallacious arguments become valid: from if A (and only if A) then C; not-A, the
conclusion not-C  follows; and similarly from if A (and only if A) then C; C, the conclusion A
follows. Consequently, if a participant endorses the conclusions of the two invalid arguments
while construing the conditional sentence as a biconditional, one cannot talk any more of
committing a fallacy because under such an interpretation the arguments become valid. It follows
that the only way to know whether people commit a fallacy, and if so, how often, is to present a
conditional premise of which the implicature is cancelled. In order to do so, Rumain, Connell, &
Braine (1983) presented a control group of participants with the invalid arguments made of a
major premise such as if there is a dog in the box, then there is an orange in the box  and the
appropriate minor premise, there is no dog in the box (for the argument of Negation of the
Antecedent) or there is an orange in the box (for the argument of Affirmation of the
consequent); the fallacies (namely, concluding there is not an orange in the box  and there is a
dog in the box, respectively) were commited 70% of the time. The experimental group was
presented with the same two premises together with an additional conditional premise such as if
there is a tiger in the box, then there is an orange in the box  indicating that there may be an
orange without a dog. This aimed at cancelling the implicature  if there is not a dog, then there is
not an orange  that is held responsible for the biconditional interpretation and therefore for the
fallacies. Indeed, participants in this group committed the fallacies only 30% of the time,
presumably because the cancellation of the implicature gave way to the conditional interpretation.
(The question of the residual 30% of fallacies is beyond the scope of this chapter). This kind of
manipulation has been widely replicated and generalised to various contexts (Byrne, 1989;
Manktelow & Fairley, 2000; Markovits, 1985).
Valid arguments and credibility of the premises.  While it is established that performance
on the invalid conditional arguments crucially depends on the interpretation of the major
conditional premise, in the past twelve years a number of experimental manipulations have
revealed interesting effects on the endorsement of the conclusion of the two valid arguments.
Cummins (1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist, 1991) studied these arguments
with causal conditionals. She demonstrated that the acceptance rate of the conclusion depends on
the domain referred to in the major premise. For example, of the two following arguments:
If the match was struck, then it lit;  the match was struck;  therefore it lit,  and
If Joe cut his finger, then it bled;  Joe cut his finger;  therefore it bled,
people are less prone to accept the conclusion of the first. The variable which was manipulated is
the number of "disabling conditions" that are available. Disabling conditions are such that their
satisfaction is sufficient to prevent an effect from occurring (and their non-satisfaction is
therefore necessary for the effect to occur, e. g. , dampness of the match, and superficiality of the
cut, respectively): the acceptance rate was a decreasing function of their number.
Thompson (1994, 1995) obtained differences in the endorsement rate of the conclusion
with causals as well as non-causal rules such as obligations, permissions and definitions by
using conditionals that varied in 'perceived sufficiency' (estimated by judges). A sufficient
relationship was defined as one in which the consequent always happens when the antecedent
does; for example, the following sentences were attributed high and low sufficiency, respectively:
If the licensing board grants them a license then a restaurant is allowed to sell liquor.  If an
athlete passes the drug test at the Olympics then the IOC can give them a medal. She observed
that the endorsement rate of the conclusion was an increasing function of the level of perceived
sufficiency.
Newstead, Ellis, Evans, and Dennis (1997) and Evans and Twyman-Musgrove (1998)
used as a variable the type of speech act conveyed by the major conditional premise; they
observed differences in the rate of endorsement of the conclusion: promises and threats on the
one hand, and tips and warnings on the other hand constituted two contrasted groups, the former
giving rise to more frequent endorsements of the conclusion than the latter. (These classes of
conditionals were investigated in the seventies by Fillenbaum, 1975, 1978). They noted that the
key factor seems to be the extent to which the speaker has control over the occurrence of the
consequent, which is higher for promises and threats than for tips and warnings.
George (1995) manipulated the credibility of the conditional premise of MP arguments.
Two groups of participants received contrasted instructions. One group was asked to assume the
truth of debatable conditionals such as If a painter is talented, then his/her works are expensive
while another group was reminded of the uncertain status of such statements. As a result, 60
percent in the first group endorsed the conclusion of at least three of the four MP arguments, but
only 25 percent did in the second group.
 While each of these authors has an explanation for his or her own results separately, it
will be proposed that there is a single explanation along the following lines (Politzer, 2003).
(i) conditionals are uttered in a background knowledge, of which they explicitly link two
units (the antecedent and the consequent), keeping implicit the rest of it, which will be called a
conditional field;
(ii) the conditional field has the structure of a disjunctive form, as proposed by Mackie
(1974) for causals. The mental representation of a conditional if A then C (excluding analytically
true conditionals) in its conditional field can be formulated as follows :
  [ (A & A1 & A2 &. . .)  v  (B & B1 & B2 &. . .) v . . ]  →  C .
A is the antecedent of the conditional under consideration; B is an alternative condition that could
justify the assertion of if B then C in an appropriate context. (The fact that alternative antecedents
like B and its conjuncts may not exist, or may be assumed to not exist, is at the origin of the if
not-A, then not-C implicature considered above, but this is not our current concern). We focus
on the abridged form,
(A & A1 & A2 &. . .)  →  C .
While (A & A1 & A2 &. . .) is a sufficient condition as a whole, each conjunct A1 , A2, . . .
separately is necessary with respect to A. These conjuncts will be called complementary
necessary conditions (henceforth CNC). Each of the CNC's has its own availability, and this
availability is part of what specifies the conditional field.
(iii) it is hypothesised that in asserting the conditional if A then C, the speaker assumes
that the necessity status of the conditions A1 , A2, . . .  is part of the cognitive environment, and
most importantly that the speaker has no reason to believe that these conditions are not satisfied.
The formula can be rewritten as:
 {A1 & A2 &. . .} & A  →  C,
where the braces indicate that the CNC's are tacitly assumed to hold. This is justified on the
basis of relevance: in uttering the conditional sentence, the speaker guarantees that the utterance
is worth paying attention to.  But this in turn requires that the speaker has no evidence that the
CNC's are unsatisfied, failing which the sentence would be of little use for inferential purposes.
(In making this assumption, one must accept that the implicature concerns not a single constant,
such as A1, but a variable Ai).
In brief, conditionals are typically uttered with an implicit ceteris paribus assumption to
the effect that the normal conditions of the world (the satisfaction of the CNC's that belong to the
cognitive environment) hold to the best of the speaker's knowledge. Suppose now that for some
reason the satisfaction of the CNC can be questioned. This typically occurs when it has high
availability. The conditional sentence no longer conveys a sufficient condition and consequently
the conclusion of the argument does not follow any more. This explains the results of the
foregoing manipulations. For the sake of simplicity the formula can be rewritten as:
{A1} & A  →  C.
Formally, from
if ({A1} & A) then C;   A,
C follows, whereas from
if (A1 & A) then C;    A,
C does not follow.  
Compare two arguments defined by different conditionals such that one has less available
CNC's (or disabling conditions in terms of causality) than the other, like If Joe cut his finger,
then it bled  against If the match was struck, then it lit:  in the first case, the low availability of the
CNC's makes it more likely that their satisfaction goes unchallenged than in the second case.
This analysis generalises to the non-causal sentences like the 'licensing board' or the 'athlete'
scenarios above. In fact, it makes a step towards the formalisation of the concept of credibility of
a conditional sentence: once the antecedent and the consequent have been identified as related to
each other, the conditional is all the more credible as there are fewer CNC's whose satisfaction is
questionable. There are close links between this claim and the classic view that belief in a
conditional is measured by the conditional belief of the consequent on the antecedent, and it can
be formally demonstrated that the former is a specification of the latter (Politzer & Bourmaud,
2002).    
  In the experiments mentioned above, there is an interesting case where the epistemic
implicature is reinforced. This is the case of the Evans et al. manipulation mentioned earlier: the
speaker of a promise or a threat warrants the satisfaction of CNC's, which he is not in a position
to do when uttering a tip or a warning. The difference is one between a warrant "to the best of
one's knowledge" and a warrant of full knowledge that renders the conditional more credible.   
Finally George's manipulation (mentioned earlier) of the level of credibility of the
conditional is another way of questioning the satisfaction of CNC's: by asking to asssume the
truth of such conditionals, participants were invited to dismiss CNC's acting as possible
objections like the painter must be famous, whereas stressing the uncertainty of the statement is
a way to invite them to take such objections into account.
Valid arguments and nonmonotonic effects. There are other means of cancelling the
implicature and this is what gives rise to nonmonotonic effects to which we now turn.
Nonmonotonic deduction is defined by the following property: consider a proposition Q that is
deducible from P; Q is not necessarily deducible from the conjunction of P with another
proposition R, contrary to the case of classic deduction.
Byrne (1989) asked one control group of participants to solve standard arguments such
as, for MP:
 If Mary meets her friend, then she will go to a play;  
Mary meets her friend;  
therefore:  (a) Mary will go to a play;   (b) Mary will not go to a play;   (c) Mary may 
or may not go to a play.
 As is commonly observed, nearly every participant chose option (a). An experimental group was
asked to solve the same arguments modified by the addition of a third premise, if Mary has
enough money, then she will go to a play. The result is that fewer than 40 percent in this group
chose option (a) and the others chose option (c). A similar effect was observed with MT. Notice
the special structure of the argument: the third (additional) premise was a conditional that had a
necessary condition in its antecedent; since it had the same consequent as the major premise, it
contained a necessary condition for the consequent of the major premise (in fact, a CNC) and
served as a means of introducing it in the context. The result has been replicated many times with
rates of non-endorsement varying from one third to two thirds, depending on sentence type and
population.
 Within the proposed framework, the additional premise raises doubt on the assumption
of satisfaction of a CNC in the main conditional. This is made possible by using the CNC in the
antecedent of another conditional: in uttering "if Mary has enough money . . " the speaker
implicates that she does not know whether or not Mary has enough money, so cancelling the
implicature that accompanies the main conditional. This  now has decreased credibility and the
conclusion follows with a level of credibility inherited from the premises. This is why in an all-
or-none format of response, a majority of people choose option (c).
This explanation has testable consequences. One, by replacing the additional conditional
sentence with a categorical sentence that expresses doubt, such as it is not sure that she has
enough money, it should be possible (i) to simulate the effect (a decrease in the rate of
endorsement of the conclusion); (ii) and to bring this rate of endorsement in fact to zero since
the doubt stems from an explicit statement and no more from an implicature that may not always
be generated. This is precisely what was observed (Politzer, in press). Two, when participants are
given a chance to evaluate the conclusion, the proportion who find it doubtful should be about
the same as the proportion who chose option (c) above; again this is what was observed.
Another consequence is that it should be possible to manipulate the credibility of the
major conditional premise by introducing various degrees of satisfaction of the CNC's and
observe correlated degrees of belief in the conclusion. This was tested by Politzer & Bourmaud
(2002) who used different MT arguments such as:
If somebody touches an object on display then the alarm is set off;  
the alarm was not set off;
therefore: nobody touched an object on display (to be evaluated on a five-point scale
ranging from certainly true to certainly false).
This was a control; in the three experimental conditions, degrees of credibillity in the conditional
were defined by way of an additional premise that provided information on a CNC:
High credibility: there was no problem with the equipment;
Low: there were some problems with the equipment;
Very low: the equipment was totally out of order.
The coefficients of corrrelation between level of credibility and belief in the truth of the
conclusion ranged between .48 and .71 and were highly significant. This result supports the
proposed theoretical approach all the more as the kind of rule used was not limited to causals but
included also means-end, remedial, and decision rules.
Nonmonotonocity is highly difficult to manage by Artificial Intelligence systems because
of the necessity of looking for possible exceptions through the entire data base. What I have
suggested is some kind of reversal of the "burden of the proof" for human cognition: at least for
conditionals (but this could generalise) looking for exceptions is itself an exception because the
conditional information comes with an implicit guarantee of normality.     
Hypothesis testing
Some people are professionally trained to test their hypotheses; they may be scientists or
practitioners such as detectives, medical doctors or technicians specialised in trouble-shooting.
But how do lay people behave when they have to put a hypothesis to the test?  One of the classic
laboratory tasks used to answer this question was designed by Wason (1960). The situation
resembles a game played between the experimenter and the participant. The experimenter
chooses a rule to generate sequences of three numbers. The aim of the game for the participant is
to discover this rule. In order to do so, the participant can use two kinds of information. The
main source of information is the result of tests which he carries out as follows: he submits
triples to the experimenter who replies every time by 'yes' (the three numbers obey the rule) or
'no' (they do not). (ii) The second source of information is an initial example of a sequence
conforming to the rule provided by the experimenter at the beginning of the game: this sequence
is 2, 4, 6. When the participant thinks he has discovered the rule, he states it; in case he is wrong,
the game may continue for another cycle until the rule stated is correct or the participant gives
up. The rule which the experimenter follows is three increasing numbers (integers). It is usually
observed that the majority of participants state at least one incorrect rule and that failure is not
uncommon. More strikingly, the incorrect rules proposed by participants often express one of
the salient features of the initial exemplar (2, 4, 6), such as even numbers, increasing by the
same interval, or increasing by two and it seems difficult for them to eliminate such hypotheses.
This is especially interesting from a pragmatic point of view because the triple 2, 4, 6 has very
salient features; given that it has been specially selected and presented as an instance by the
experimenter, participants are thereby invited to assume that its features are relevant; but
unluckily for the participant, these features overdetermine the rule (the numbers need not be even,
they need not increase by two, etc. in order to follow the rule actually used), so that one can
consider that the whole situation is deceptive. As every teacher knows, it is misleading to offer an
example of a concept that is too specific. This analysis made on theoretical grounds (Politzer,
1986) has received support from the results of a recent experiment performed by Van der Henst,
Rossi, & Schroyens (2002). In their experimental procedure, the 2, 4, 6 instance was not
presented to participants as resulting from a deliberate choice made by the experimenter, but
rather as the output of a computer program which randomly generated instances of the rule: the
authors observed that the erroneous first solutions diminished by one half, and that the mean
number of rules proposed as solutions diminished by one third, presumably because the salient
features are not presumed to be relevant if they are the result of a random, non-intentional
process.
The 2, 4, 6 task is not the only inductive task that deserves pragmatic scrutinising. One of
the most extensively investigated tasks in the psychology of reasoning, also due to Wason and
also designed to study hypothesis testing behaviour, is the four-card problem (or selection task)
in which participants are required to select the information that they think is necessary in order to
test whether a conditional rule is true or false. Studies by Sperber, Cara & Girotto (1995) and
Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber & van der Henst (2001) show that the task as understood by the
experimenter is rather opaque to participants. Ironically, the comprehension mechanisms pre-
empt any domain-specific reasoning mechanism, so that the task cannot be considered as one of
reasoning in the strict sense.  
Studies of probabilistic judgment
There is a huge psychological literature on probabilistic judgment that dates back to the
sixties. The conclusion which has been retained, especially among philosophers and economists,
is that performance is poor and often reveals irrational judgments. This widely shared opinion is
essentially due to the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982 for an overview). Whether they are
right or wrong is not an issue to debate here; instead, it can be argued that their demonstration is
often unconvincing because in too many cases they grossly neglected the pragmatic analysis of
their experimental paradigms. Two of these tasks, posssibly the most famous ones, the Linda
problem and the Lawyer-Engineer problem, will be discussed.
The conjunction fallacy (the Linda problerm).  In a typical version of the experimental
paradigm, participants are presented with the following description:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright; she majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).  
They are then asked to decide which of the following statements is the most probable:
- Linda is a bank teller (B);
- Linda is active in the feminist movement (F);
- Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement (B+F).  
Whatever the response format (multiple choice, rank ordering, etc) over 80 percent judge
B+F to be more probable than B, in apparent violation of a fundamental axiom of probability
theory which requires that the probability of a conjunction be no more probable than that of any
one of its conjuncts. The authors take this result as evidence for the use of the representativeness
heuristic, that is, an assessment of the degree of correspondence between a model and an
outcome: being a 'feminist bank teller' (B+F) is more representative of the description because it
has one common feature with the description, which 'bank teller' (B) is lacking. This explanation
is appealing if only because of its simplicity but it cannot be accepted before a pragmatic
analysis of the task has been made. Now, from this point of view, there are two main problems
with the task.  
The first problem is that the crucial options have an obvious anomaly: in comparing two
items B vs (B and F), there are two permissible construals for B in the first option, viz. an
inclusive construal (B whether or not F), and an exclusive one that carries an implicature (B but
not F).    
The claim that the implicature is licensed by the juxtaposition of the two options was
supported by the results of the following manipulation (Politzer & Noveck, 1991; see Dulany
and Hilton, 1991 for a similar approach). Keeping constant a scenario that depicted a very
brilliant and determined student, two formulations of the options  were presented to two
experimental groups as follows:
The first group had clearly nested options (and for this reason it was hypothesised that
conjunction errors would be less frequent than in a Linda-type control):   
1) Daniel entered Medical School.
2) Daniel dropped out of Medical School for lack of interest.
3) Daniel graduated from Medical School.
The second group had the same options, but with the explicit mention of the inclusion structure
of the questions introduced by and, which was predicted to trigger an implicature attached to
option one:
1) Daniel entered Medical School.
2) Daniel entered Medical School and dropped outfor lack of interest.
3) Daniel entered Medical School and graduated.
Indeed, while 77 percent committed the error on the Linda-type control the rate of errors
collapsed to 31 percent for the first control, but as predicted it increased significantly to 53
percent for the second control.
The second problem with the task is even more basic; it revolves around the task
representation. From a computational point of view, Linda's profile is useless: all the necessary
and sufficient logical information is given in the options. But participants normally assume the
description to be relevant and one obvious way to satisfy this is to consider the task as a test of
one's sociological or psychological skills and the description as a source of information that
provides a theme together with the necessary evidence for or against the answer to a question
(the possibility that Linda is a feminist): the and-not interpretation of option (B) is then
constrained.    
This point is important in relation with the between-subject task. In this variant of the
task, only one statement is presented: B to one group, and B+F to the other, and participants are
asked to estimate the probability of the statement. As B+F is rated as more probable than B,
many investigators have been convinced in favour of the representativeness theory. But what this
demonstrates is only that participants are enclined to try to render the description relevant to the
question asked: they identify the kind of activity which provides greater relevance to the
description of the character and like when one has to imagine what could be the best end of a
story, it does not have to be the most probable event - rather, it generally is not.
 The base rate fallacy (the Lawyer-Engineer problem).  In this paradigm, participants are
told that a panel of psychologists has written personality descriptions of 30 engineers and 70
lawyers (the associated proportions provide what is called the base rates).  A description that is
assumed to have been chosen at random and that coincides with the stereotype of an engineer is
presented; one group of participants is asked to estimate the probability that the person described
is an engineer; another group is asked to do the same based on the reversed base rates: 70
engineers and 30 lawyers. Provided some technical assomptions are satisfied, standard
probability theory requires that the estimate given by the first group should be lower than that of
the second group. The first study reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) showed no
difference, hence the widely held belief that 'people are insensitive to the base rates'; however,
more recent studies have shown that people do take base rates into account, although "not
optimally or even consistently" (Koehler, 1996). Tversky & Kahneman's explanation for their
results is again based on the representative heuristic: people would base their judgment
exclusively on the extent to which the description fits the stereotype. This explanation is again
problematic because it does not take into account the participants' representation of the task. In a
recent series of experiments (Politzer & Macchi, in press) it was hypothesised that people view
the task as a request to exploit a psychological description that is assumed to be relevant. If that
is the case, the neglect of base rates should be relative and could be suppressed in an
experimental condition where no psychological description is provided but instead the
psychological characterisation is provided in a single statement to the effect that the person's
description is typical of an engineer: in this way, the outcome is available (in order to let the
representativeness heuristic operate, if at all) but the details are missing in order to suppress the
interpretation of the task as one of extraction of a psychological profile from such data. In being
told that the description is typical, these participants receive a near answer to the question, which
makes it lack relevance; consequently, they reinterpret the question as a request for an
unconditioned probability, which enables them to render both the statement of typicality and the
base rate information relevant and to fulfill the task, so that most of them should give the base
rate as their response. This is what was observed (85 percent used the base rate exclusively while
the rate of its use in a control group was 17 percent). It seems therefore that the paradigm could
be better described as showing that people have difficulty in combining information from two
sources, the base rates and the individuating information, and that they focus on the one that
maximises relevance. Previous research has shown that when the psychological description is
uninformative (that is, completely non diagnostic between the engineer and the lawyer
stereotypes), they rely entirely on the base rates.
Class inclusion and categorisation
Class inclusion in children.  One of the most thoroughly investigated paradigms in
developmental psychology during the period that goes from the sixties to the eighties, and which
nowadays is still subject to debate is class-inclusion, initially created by Piaget (Piaget &
Szeminska, 1941; Piaget & Inhelder, 1959). In a typical experiment, the child is presented with
the picture of five daisies and three tulips, and then asked, "Are there more daisies or more
flowers ?" The rate of what is considered the correct response, "more flowers", reaches the 50%
value only around 8 or 9 years of age. This highly robust result is puzzling given the well-
documented precocity in the acquisition of lexical hierarchies. We will consider in turn the
interpretation of the interrogative sentence and the representation of the task.
First, the microanalysis indicates that the relation of hyperonymy-hyponymy between
flower and tulip/daisy licenses the use of flower to refer to either all the flowers or a subclass of
them. Indeed, it can be demonstrated that in the experimental setting, flower is indeterminate
between an inclusive sense (all the flowers) and an exclusive sense (tulip). This was done as
follows. Two groups of 6- and 7-year-old children were presented with the picture. The control
group was just asked (i) to first point to the flowers, (ii) and then to the daisies; in contrast, the
experimental group was asked the same questions in the reversed order. Whereas in the control
group 90% of the children asked to point to the flowers pointed to all the flowers, in the
experimental group half of the children pointed to all the flowers and the other half pointed to
the tulips. This demonstrates that flower apparently had become completely indeterminate in the
context of daisy. Half of the children decided that flower must refer to the flowers that are not
daisies presumably because the word daisy had just been used; the other half were not able or
not willing to make this decision.
Consequently, the standard class-inclusion question is ambiguous because the lexeme
flower can receive either its inclusive/hyperonym or its exclusive/hyponym interpretation. It
follows that many children may compare the daisies with the tulips (which is well documented),
a comparison that is not intended by the experimenter though semantically permitted, and
pragmatically justifiable under one representation of the task as we will see shortly.
If this explanation is correct, it should be possible to enhance performance by
disambiguating the question. This was done in another experiment that used a double
disambiguation procedure. Firstly, 5- to 8-year-old children were requested to "point to the
flowers" and then to "point to the daisies" (as in the previous experiment). Secondly, they were
asked a modified class-inclusion question in which all three terms appeared: "Are there more
tulips, or more daisies, or more flowers?" The 5-year-olds reached the 50% rate of success
(control: 6%) and the 7- and 8-year-olds were very close to the 100% rate (control: 30%). Two
other experiments showed that each disambiguating procedure is effective separately but less
than in combination. In brief, the disambiguation of the question has revealed that children
acquire inclusion three to four years earlier than previously claimed.
But still a major question remains to be answered:  Why do children change their response
to the standard question when they are about 8 or 9 years old? The answer is that the younger
choose the exclusive interpretation of flowers (tulips) and the older the inclusive interpretation
(all the flowers). But again, why ? This question leads us to the macroanalysis and the
representation of the task. So long as the child attributes to the experimenter an interest in
knowing whether he can count (one of the great achievements during that period) the relevant
comparison is between the tulips and the daisies (this response is likely to produce the more
cognitive effects: you will know that I know how to count). But when the child has progressed
enough in the development of metacognitive skills such as logical necessity (Cormier &
Dagenais, 1983; Miller, Custer & Nassau, 2000) and awareness of semantic ambiguities
(Gombert, 1990) he can attribute to the experimenter an interest in these abilities, and the relevant
comparison shifts to comparing all the flowers and the daisies, which yields the "correct"
response. In brief, this overview of an old paradigm in the study of logical development shows
once again that the verbal material and the speaker/experimenter - hearer/participant relationship
must be pragmatically scrutinized.
Categorisation: mathematical hierarchies.   Although the approach taken here is focused on
laboratory tasks, the analysis that has been proposed can help identify some sources of difficulty
in learning mathematical concepts; more specifically the application of the foregoing analysis of
the inclusion question to lexical hierarchies reveals a tension between the use that is made of
them by the lay person/student on one hand and the scientist/teacher on the other hand.
We noticed earlier that the standard class-inclusion question is ambiguous because the
lexical unit flower can receive either its inclusive/hyperonym interpretation or its
exclusive/hyponym interpretation. This case is reminiscent of markedness: opting for the
inclusive rather than the exclusive meaning amounts to opting for an unmarked rather than a
marked interpretation. This is at the basis of riddles such as "What animal barks but is not a
dog?"  the solution of which is blocked if dog is interpreted as unmarked but transparent if dog
is interpreted as contrasting with bitch. (This ambiguity is sometimes referred to as privative).
Now, as far as mathematical hierarchies are concerned, the speaker's freedom to use an
ambiguous lexical unit is constrained by the register of the communication. In daily life, it seems
that the items on such hierarchies are essentially used exclusively; for instance, square contrasts
with rectangle, (which in turn contrasts with parallellogram, etc.), which means that for a
"naive" person no square is a rectangle. On the contrary, in the mathematical vocabulary, items
on the same hierarchy are used inclusively: a square is a special rectangle (which in turn is a
special parallellogram, etc.); hence technically all squares are rectangles. Similarly, for the
layman integers are not decimal numbers although mathematically they are. In brief, whenever
two items are compared, the subset-to-set relations generated by the folk hierarchy and the
mathematical hierarchy are logical contraries (note 1). It follows that a crucial difficulty in the
learning of these classifications lies in the student's capability to shift appropriately from his
familiar classification to the technical one (Politzer, 1991). The cognitive difficulty is illustrated
in Figures 1a and 1b which show both hierarchies for elementary geometry.
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here]
Conclusion
From a methodological point of view, the experimental study of thinking is among the
most difficult in cognitive psychology to carry out. This is the area where the representation of
the task interferes the most with the thought process under study, to such an extent that the task
may be devoid of validity if no precaution is taken. It has been argued that precautionary
measures should include two kinds of analysis. One, that has been called macroanalysis, aims to
determine the task representation, that is the participant/student's attributions to the
experimenter/teacher about the latter's expectations regarding the former's knowledge or
performance. This is based on the content of each task, taking into account the specificity of the
relationship between experimenter/teacher and participant/student which creates a special element
of pretense in their communication. The other, that has been called microanalysis, takes into
account the result of the first and aims to determine the disambiguations, referential assignments
and implicatures which the participant/student works out on the way to his final interpretation of
the premises, questions, problem statement and the like. When such analyses yield
interpretations that are at variance with the experimenter's intended meaning it is possible to write
up an alternative formulation or to design an alternative task whose validity is no more
questionable and to compare performance on this new task with the initial one. In the past, many
unwarranted conclusions have been drawn from participants' seemingly poor performance in
terms of human irrationality. The experimental method that compares initial and modified
materials on the basis of pragmatic theory plays a crucial role to redress the balance.
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Footnote
1.  One might argue that this phenomenon is but a particular case of scalar phenomenon, by
which the use of rectangle  on the scale implicates not square, a higher item on the scale (Horn,
1972).  However, while it is easy to imagine or observe in daily life utterances that exhibit literal
meaning on various scales (quantifiers, modals, frequency terms, etc.) it seems debatable that this
happens with mathematical classifications.  Whether rectangle can refer to a square in a non
mathematical context is an open question that could be answered empirically. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that there is no lexical unit in ordinary English to refer to
the set of figures that conjoins the squares and the rectangles. That it is so is understandable: in
daily life, it is the exclusive contrast that is useful; the inclusive contrast has only a
metacognitiven theoretical interest, which justifies its scholar use.


